Aunque muchos lectores de las novelas de Unamuno notan que el estilo de su primera novela, “Paz en la guerra” (1897), es bastante tradicional y que, por consiguiente, difiere mucho del estilo de las novelas que don Miguel escribe después, también tiene elementos que la vinculan claramente sus novelas más tardías. Uno de estos es el manejo del tiempo, el cual hace que el tiempo se detenga y produce lo que Henri Bergson llamaría la “virtualización” del tiempo. El tiempo también (...) se detiene y se virtualiza en otras novelas de Unamuno—en particular, “Niebla”. Por ejemplo, en “Niebla” varias anomalías temporales revelan el deseo de Unamuno de detener el tiempo y eternizar el momento para así escapar la muerte y existir perpetuamente, un deseo también presente en “Paz en la guerra”. Por lo tanto, el presente muestra que, por su manejo particular del tiempo, “Paz en la guerra” se vincula claramente a novelas más experimentales de Unamuno. (shrink)

Nous avons voulu procéder à une reformulation de la célèbre énigme de Cedric Price qui remettait en question les promesses de la technologie. Nous avons donc formulé la provocation suivante : « Le design est la réponse, mais quelle était la question? ». Dans ce cas, quelle pourrait être la promesse du design? Nous posons une autre question : « Si le design n’est pas la réponse, qu’est-ce qu’il pourrait être? » Quelle que soit la réponse, nous disons clairement que (...) ce que le design peut faire est de répondre aux échos de notre relation avec tous et tout ce qui se trouve sur la planète que nous partageons – notre maison commune – et de se demander ce qui pourrait ne pas advenir dans un monde-sans-nous – un monde impensable. (shrink)

We propose that scientific representation is a special case of a more general notion of representation, and that the relatively well worked-out and plausible theories of the latter are directly applicable to thc scientific special case. Construing scientific representation in this way makes the so-called “problem of scientific representation” look much less interesting than it has seerned to many, and suggests that some of the (hotly contested) debates in the literature are concerned with non-issues.

In 21st century America, personhood is under daily assault, sometimes with dire consequences. Scientist, ethicist, and ordained minister Craig C. Malbon encourages the reader to consider such assaults on personhood endured by victims of abortion, ageism, Alzheimer's disease, drug addiction, mental and physical disabilities, gender, gender orientation, racism, sexual preference, identity politics, and our will-to-power over the "other." In exploring personhood status, Malbon poses difficult questions for us. Is personhood assigned as all-or-nothing, or is it a sliding scale based (...) upon criteria arbitrarily aimed at our vulnerabilities? Does the voiceless embryo and fetus have advocates who can speak to the moral question of abortion? Is the personhood of an economically insecure pregnant woman degraded to the point where lack of access to early termination of pregnancy results in "coercive childbearing?" Does being a member of the LGBTQI+ community target one for assaults on personhood, to the extreme of being killed? In delving into the biology and psychology of assaults of "self" upon the "other," Malbon sees powerful linkages of everyday assaults on personhood to darker, profound "original sins" that are foundational to the rise of the American empire, i.e., assaults on the indigenous Native Americans and assaults derivative to the institution of slavery upon Africans, African Americans, and their descendants. (shrink)

It has long been a commonly held belief among classicists that traditional Romans frowned upon male homosexuality and associated it with the influence of Greek culture. There have always been exceptions to this belief, but when Paul Veyne published the following remarks in his 1978 article ‘La famille et l'amour sous le hautempire romain’, his views were quite heterodox: Il est faux que l'amour ‘grec’ soit, à Rome, d'origine grecque: comme plus d'une société méditerranéenne de nos jours encore, Rome n'a (...) jamais opposé l'amour des femmes à celui des garçons: elle a opposé l'activité à la passivité; être actif, c'est être un mâle, quel que soit le sexe du partenaire passif. (shrink)

The article examines an 'hermeneutical revival' of Augustine, that is, the philosophical significance of the historical and methodological influence of St. Augustine on Martin Heidegger's Sein und Zeit, and how this is becoming increasingly more evident in the contribution of scholars of phenomenology and patrology to this discussion, especially since 1993.

Talbot School of Theology, La Mirada, CA 90639, USA.

The standard philosophical project of analysing the concept of knowledge has radical defects in its arbitrary restriction of the subject matter, and its risky theoretical presuppositions. Edward Craig suggests a more illuminating approach, akin to the `state of nature' method found in political theory, which builds up the concept from a hypothesis about the social function of knowledge and the needs it fulfils. Light is thrown on much that philosophers have written about knowledge, about its analysis and the obstacles (...) to its analysis, and on the debate over scepticism. It becomes apparent why many languages not only have such constructions as `knows whether' and `knows that', but also have equivalents of `knows how to' and `know' followed by a direct object. Thus the inquiry is both broadened in scope and made theoretically less fragile. (shrink)

Richard Popkin’s meticulous translation--the most complete since the eighteenth century--contains selections from thirty-nine articles, as well as from Bayle’s four Clarifications. The bulk of the major articles of philosophical and theological interest--those that influenced Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, and Voltaire and formed the basis for so many eighteenth-century discussions--are present, including David, Manicheans, Paulicians, Pyrrho, Rorarius, Simonides, Spinoza, and Zeno of Elea.

El artículo estudia la teoría de la guerra justa, en san Agustín, considerándolo como el fundador de esta teoría, ya que fue el primero en articular los criterios perennes dentro del marco de "ethos" cristiano del amor e igualdad como seres humanos creados a imagen y semejanza del Creador. Trata también del influjo de Agustín en el desarrollo de esta teoría de la guerra justa.

El artículo trata sobre el 'reavivamiento hermeneútico' de Agustín, es decir, acerca de la significación filosófica que tiene el influjo histórico y metodológico de san Agustín sobre la obra de Martin Heidegger "Sein und Zeit", y cómo esto se ha vuelto más evidente con las aportaciones de fenomenólogos y patrólogos, especialmente a partir de 1993.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Craig Walton 1934-2007Rudolf A. Makkreel and Gerald A. PressThe Journal of the History of Philosophy is saddened to report that Craig Walton died on October 11th, 2007. Professor Walton served the Journal for many years. He was involved with it from its inception in 1963 and knew personally many of the founding philosophers, who had been at the Claremont Graduate Center. He was the Book Review Editor (...) from 1975 until 1981 and was a member of the Board of Directors from 1978 until 2004, where he promoted the study of the history of philosophy in many ways and maintained our institutional memory. For instance, it was Craig who remembered the important roles Salih Alich and Oskar Piest played in our early history. From 2001–03, he was the Treasurer of the Board. He believed strongly in the cosmopolitan nature of scholarship, and, as Book Review Editor, he was tireless in his efforts to review books on the history of philosophy written in languages other than English.Craig was born on December 6, 1934, in Los Angeles and earned his doctorate in philosophy at Claremont Graduate University in 1965. His dissertation, De la recherche du bien: A Study of Malebranche's Science of Ethics, was approved in 1964 by a doctoral committee that included Theodore Waldman, Herbert Schneider, and Philip Merlan, though he also worked with Richard Popkin, the founder of the Journal. He taught at the University of Southern California, Northern Illinois University and Emory University before moving to the University of Nevada, Las Vegas in 1972. Craig was Chair of the Philosophy Department there from 1986 to 1989 and became the Director of the Institute for Ethics and Policy at UNLV in 1987. He held this post until his retirement in 2004. After his early work on Malebranche, for much of his career he was a scholar of David Hume and Thomas Hobbes; but he spent the last decade of his life urging that ethical issues be studied across the curriculum. Upon retiring from teaching, Craig extended his work in ethics by founding the Nevada Center for Public Ethics. The Chancellor of the Nevada System of Higher Education praised Craig as the voice of ethics in Nevada.As members of the Board of Directors of the Journal of the History of Philosophy, we remember Craig Walton for his enthusiasm for the history of philosophy and his warmth as a human being.Copyright © 2007 Journal of the History of Philosophy, Inc.... (shrink)

Resumen Hace 78 años, en “Un Mundo Feliz”, el escritor Aldous Huxley, en un prodigioso tono satírico, se anticipó con asombrosa precisión a los grandes temas de la agenda científica y política del Siglo XXI: la reproducción controlada, el choque de civilizaciones y la clonación humana, entre otros. Hace unos días, a mediados de mayo de 2010, el J. Craig Venter Institute anunció que había producido la primera célula sin historia genética creada en un laboratorio a partir de un (...) genoma sintetizado químicamente. Hoy, describiendo el estado “posthumano” de la historia, Francis Fukuyama afirma: “Huxley tenía razón”. Palabras clave: bioética; ingeniería genética; democracia; totalitarismo; biotécnica; eugenesia ;utopías; distopias. Huxley’s Prophecy and the Biotech Century: Post-human society is reaching usSeventy-eight years ago, in “A Happy World”, the writer Aldous Huxley, in a prodigious satiric tone, anticipated with astonishing accurateness the big topics of the XXI Century’s scientific and political agenda: controlled reproduction, civilization clash and human cloning, among others. Some days ago, in mid-May 2010, the J. Craig Venter Institute announced that it had produced the first genetic history free cell created in a laboratory from a chemically synthesized genome. Today, in describing the “post-human” state of history, Francis Fukuyama asserts: “Huxley was right”. Keywords: Bioethics;Genetic Engineering; Democracy; Totalitarianism; Biotechnology;Eugenics ; Utopias; Dystopias. (shrink)

En este trabajo matemático-filosófico se estudian cuatro tópicos de la Lógica matemática: El método de construcción de modelos llamado Ultraproductos, la Propiedad de Interpolación de Craig, las Álgebras booleanas y los Órdenes parciales separativos. El objetivo principal del mismo es analizar la importancia que tienen dichos tópicos para el estudio de los fundamentos de la matemática, desde el punto de vista del platonismo matemático. Para cumplir con tal objetivo se trabajará en el ámbito de la Matemática, de la Metamatemática (...) y de la Filosofía de la matemática. El desarrollo de la investigación arrojó como resultado que tales tópicos son muy importantes para el estudio de los fundamentos de la matemática, desde el punto de vista del platonismo matemático, y en el trabajo se explica detalladamente con abundantes ejemplos el porqué (al final de cada sección y al final del mismo). (shrink)

Resumen: Actualmente el término genealogía se encuentra bastante extendido en las ciencias sociales como una metodología empleada para explicar problemas contemporáneos. Con todo, la genealogía, en tanto forma de conocimiento, se emplea de maneras disímiles. Filósofos contemporáneos como Bernard Williams y Edward Craig han abordado distintas perspectivas genealógicas, caracterizando las cualidades y posibilidades que ofrece cada una e identificando así dos tipos: lo que denominan genealogías reales y genealogías imaginarias o ficcionales. En este artículo argumento que dicha clasificación es (...) problemática pues, el término genealogía sustancialmente hace referencia a algo que no puede ser imaginario o ficcional. La forma de conocer del genealogista se basa en la recolección de trozos de historia real que permitirán mirar el objeto estudiado desde una nueva perspectiva, por lo tanto, hablar de genealogías imaginarias o ficcionales resulta contradictorio.: Currently the term genealogy is widespread in the social sciences as a methodology used to explain contemporary problems. However, genealogy, as a form of knowledge, is used in different ways. Contemporary philosophers such as Bernard Williams and Edward Craig have addressed different genealogical perspectives, characterizing the qualities and possibilities offered by each and identifying two types: what they call real genealogies and imaginary or fictional genealogies. In this article I argue that such a classification is problematic, because the term genealogy substantially refers to something that cannot be imaginary or fictional. The genealogist’s way of knowing is based on recollecting pieces of real history that will allow him or her to look at the subject matter from a new perspective; therefore, to speak of imaginary or fictional genealogies is contradictory. (shrink)

El propósito de este ensayo es explorar la doctrina política de Platón sobre la democracia a partir del concepto sinergia, es decir, de poder sinérgico, colaboración creativa que reduce los grados de dominación en el régimen político, tal como lo entiende James Craig. Aunque el concepto de poder sinérgico no fue conocido por Platón y ha sido descuidado tanto por la politología como por la filosofía política, considero que es el criterio indispensable para dejar en claro muchas de las (...) ambigüedades del pensamiento platónico. Partimos de la paradójica premisa que Platón pretende crear un autoritarismo absoluto sin dominación. En el desarrollo, se hará evidente que el pensamiento político de Platón está condicionado por unos supuestos que le obligan a aceptar un utopismo irrealizable. Entre esos supuestos destaca la Falacia Angélica, tal como la expone Mortimer Adler. También supone una concepción absolutista de la libertad positiva, así como que la libertad moral atrapada en un estado estancado. La conclusión se resume en un cuadro comparativo entre las características de la utopía platónica y el ideal sinérgico. Destaca en dicho cuadro como Platón toma partido por el autoritarismo virtuoso que condena la transformación política al reino de lo imaginario, en vez de tomar partido por las formas de gobierno compartido. Esto ha dado como resultado histórico la tentación totalitaria de pensar que hay algo mejor que la democracia. Palabras Clave : Platón; política; democracia; sinergia; libertad moral; libertad positiva; falacia angélica. Plato against democracy or the misfortunes of synergyThe purpose of this essay is to explore Plato’s political doctrine on democracy in the light of the concept of synergy, that is to say, of synergic power, which is a creative cooperation that lowers the degrees of domination within the political regime, as is understood by James Craig. Although the concept of synergic power was not known by Plato, and has been neglected by both political science and political philosophy, I consider it to be the indispensable criterion to clarify many ambiguities of Platonic thought. We start from the paradoxical premise that Plato intends to create an absolute authoritarianism without domination. As we progress it will become evident that Plato’s political thought is conditioned by assumptions that make him accept an unfeasible utopianism. Among those assumptions there stands out the Angelical Fallacy, as is exposed by Mortimer Adler. It also implies an absolutistic conception of positive freedom, as well as the idea that moral freedom is trapped in a stagnant state. The conclusion is summed up in a chart comparing the characteristics of Platonic utopia and synergic ideal. In that chart there stands out how Plato takes sides for virtuous authoritarianism, which dooms political transformation to the realm of the imaginary, instead of taking sides for the forms of shared government. This has brought as a historical result the totalitarian temptation of thinking that there might be something better than democracy. Keywords : Plato; Politics; Democracy; Synergy; Moral Freedom; Positive Freedom; Angelical Fallacy. (shrink)

Le théâtre, contrairement au cinéma, serait par excellence l’art de la coprésence entre acteurs et spectateurs. Pourtant, la récente apparition de robots sur la scène vient semer un doute : l’acteur serait-il menacé d’être bientôt éclipsé par des machines qui ont « les allures de la vie sans avoir la vie »? L’humain serait-il l’objet d’une nouvelle mise en cause radicale, un siècle après Maeterlinck, Jarry et Craig? L’auteur aborde ces questions en s’appuyant sur la pièce emblématique Sayonara de (...) Oriza Hirata (2012) qui met en scène un robot humanoïde. Il analyse dans quelle mesure on peut rapprocher cette proposition scénique de l’art de la marionnette, et en quoi le devenir-acteur du robot réactualise, ou déplace, la partition entre vivant et artificiel sur la scène. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The use of intuitions as evidence is widespread in epistemology, but not uncontroversial. For over a decade and a half, some experimental epistemologists have called into question this appeal to epistemic intuitions. These philosophers bring the methods of experimental psychology, in particular survey methods, to bear on epistemological theorizing. Given their commitment to the relevance of empirical work to philosophical theory construction, they qualify as methodological naturalists. But some methodological naturalists who also recommend giving up appeals to intuition as (...) evidence do not base their case on experimental surveys. In this article I consider two main challenges to the standard practice of appealing to intuitions posed by these naturalist philosophers and argue that a Craig-style epistemological project can allow the methodological naturalist to address them. Anyway I conclude that, regardless of the truth of the Craigian approach, intuitions still have a role to play in epistemological theorizing in the adjudication between approaches. (shrink)

Es incuestionable el hecho de la evolución, así como la admisión de una realidad previa de la cual partir, sea creada o no. Pero luce cuestionable el mecanismo de la evolución en clave de “selección natural” cuando se la entiende como netamente naturalista. El evolucionismo darwinista no tiene fundamento suficiente para afirmar que las especies evolucionan de modo totalmente aleatorio y sin finalidad definida. Los más recientes descubrimientos socavan los cimientos del darwinismo (J. Enrique Cáceres-Arrieta), y nos hablan de un (...) Diseñador creando el universo de la nada en un tiempo finito y aceptando la evidencia del Big-Bang (William Lane Craig). Otros tipos de evolucionismo, aunque rechazan la teleología, admiten sin embargo, la teleonomía, que no es incompatible con la tesis agustiniana del “creacionismo evolutivo”. En estos tipos de evolucionismo sí cabe una tendencialidad antrópica como la defendida por Agustín, a través de sus razones seminales-causales y de los distintos modos de creación derivados de aquel “simul et in ictu” creacional. Las distintas creaciones virtuales, también simultáneas y derivadas de la creación propia “ex nihilo”, no implican que sean efectivas “simul” también las especies o prototipos. Una cosa es el hecho de la creación simultánea y otro el de su real y existencial efecto en el tiempo. En esta idea encontramos la fundamentación para defender un creacionismo evolutivo a lo agustiniano, que podría sintonizar con otros evolucionismos al estilo de X. Zubiri, K. Rahner, Pedro Laín Entralgo,… Palabras clave: creacionismo; creacionismo evolutivo; creación virtual; evolucionismo; razón seminal; fixismo (o fijismo); principio o sentido antrópico. Saint Augustine versus Darwin: Evolutionary Creacionism of ‘Seminal Reasons’Evolution is an unquestionable fact, and so is the admission of a previous reality from which to start up, whether created or not. But the mechanism of evolution in terms of “natural selection” does look questionable, when the latter is understood as entirely naturalistic. Darwinist evolutionism has no sufficient grounds to assert that species evolve in a totally random way, without a defined end. The most recent discoveries undermine the foundations of Darwinism (J. Enrique Cáceres-Arrieta), and tell us about a Designer creating the universe out of nothing in a finite time, accepting the big bang theory (William Lane Craig). Other types of evolutionism, while rejecting teleology, do admit teleonomy, which is not incompatible with the Augustinian thesis of “evolutionary creationism”. In these kinds of evolutionism it is indeed possible to speak of anthropic tendencies, as was defended by Augustine by means of his seminal-causal reasons and the different modes of creation derived from that creational “simul et in ictu”. The different virtual creations, simultaneous as well and derived from the “ex nihilo” creation, do not entail that the species or prototypes should also be effective “simul”. One thing is the fact of simultaneous creation; a different one is its real and existential effect over time. In this idea we find the grounds on which to defend an Augustinian-like evolutionary creationism, which might be compatible with other types of evolutionism like those of X. Zubiri, K. Rahner, Pedro Laín Entralgo,… Keywords : Creationism;Evolutionary Creationism; Virtual Creation; Evolutionism; Seminal Reason; Fixism; Anthropic Sense or Principle. (shrink)

The approach set forth by Edward Craig in Knowledge and the State of Nature has a greater explanatory value than it has been granted to date, and his suitably modified project can resolve a number of puzzling issues regarding the value of knowledge. The paper argues that a novel theory that relates knowledge to testimony is capable of explaining why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief and why it has a distinctive value. Significantly, this theory avoids the (...) recently advanced revisionism regarding the focus of epistemological research. La aproximación de Edward Craig en Knowledge and the State of Nature tiene más poder explicativo del apreciado hasta ahora, y su proyecto, adecuadamente modificado, puede resolver un número de asuntos sobre el valor del conocimiento que parecen desconcertantes. Se argumenta que una novedosa teoría de conocimiento que lo relaciona con el testimonio puede explicar por qué el conocimiento es más valioso que la mera creencia verdadera, y por qué tiene un valor distintivo. Significativamente, la teoría evita un revisionismo, recientemente avanzado, con respecto al foco de la investigación epistemológica. (shrink)

Many contemporary theorists charge that naïve realists are incapable of accounting for illusions. Various sophisticated proposals have been ventured to meet this charge. Here, we take a different approach and dispute whether the naïve realist owes any distinctive account of illusion. To this end, we begin with a simple, naïve account of veridical perception. We then examine the case that this account cannot be extended to illusions. By reconstructing an explicit version of this argument, we show that it depends critically (...) on the contention that perceptual experience is diaphanous, or more minimally and precisely, that there can be no difference in phenomenal properties between two experiences without a difference in the scenes presented in those experiences. Finding no good reason to accept this claim, we develop and defend a simple, naïve account of both veridical perception and illusion, here dubbed Simple, Austere Naïve Realism. (shrink)

Visual experiences seem to exhibit phenomenological particularity: when you look at some object, it – that particular object – looks some way to you. But experiences exhibit generality too: when you look at a distinct but qualitatively identical object, things seem the same to you as they did in seeing the first object. Naïve realist accounts of visual experience have often been thought to have a problem with each of these observations. It has been claimed that naïve realist views cannot (...) account for the generality of visual experiences, and that the naïve realist explanation of particularity has unacceptable implications for self- knowledge: the knowledge we have of the character of our own experiences. We argue in this paper that neither claim is correct: naïve realism can explain the generality of experiences, and the naïve realist explanation of particularity raises no problems for our self-knowledge. (shrink)

Is the quantum state part of the furniture of the world? Einstein found such a position indigestible, but here I present a different understanding of the wavefunction that is easy to stomach. First, I develop the idea that the wavefunction is nomological in nature, showing how the quantum It or Bit debate gets subsumed by the corresponding It or Bit debate about laws of nature. Second, I motivate the nomological view by casting quantum mechanics in a “classical” formalism (Hamilton–Jacobi theory) (...) and classical mechanics in a “quantum” formalism (Koopman–von Neumann theory) and then comparing and contrasting classical and quantum wave functions. I argue that Humeans about laws can treat classical and quantum wave functions on a par and that doing so yields many benefits. (shrink)

Naive realists hold that experience is to be understood in terms of an intimate perceptual relation between a subject and aspects of the world, relative to a certain standpoint. Those aspects of the world themselves shape the contours of consciousness. But blurriness is an aspect of some of our experiences that does not seem to come from the world. I argue that this constitutes a significant challenge to some forms of naive realism. But I also argue that there is a (...) robust form of naive realism which is unfazed by the blurriness of some of our experiences, even when that blurriness is understood as a subjective modification of consciousness. (shrink)

I argue that we should question the orthodox way of thinking about epistemological disjunctivism. I suggest that we can formulate epistemological disjunctivism in terms of states of seeing things as opposed to states of seeing that p. Not only does this alternative formulation capture the core aspects of epistemological disjunctivism as standardly formulated, it has two salient advantages. First, it avoids a crucial problem that arises for a standard formulation of epistemological disjunctivism—the basis problem. And second, it is less committed (...) than standard formulations are in the metaphysics of perception. (shrink)

In a 2010 article Turri puts forward some powerful considerations which suggest that Williamson's view of knowledge as the most general factive mental state is false. Turri claims that this view is false since it is false that if S sees that p, then S knows that p. Turri argues that there are cases in which (A) S sees that p but (B) S does not know that p. In response I offer linguistic evidence to suppose that in propositional contexts (...) “see” does not have the sort of meaning (a purely perceptual meaning) which would sustain Turri's claims about the cases he offers (specifically, the (A) verdicts). (shrink)

Naïve Realists think that the ordinary mind-independent objects that we perceive are constitutive of the character of experience. Some understand this in terms of the idea that experience is diaphanous: that the conscious character of a perceptual experience is entirely constituted by its objects. My main goal here is to argue that Naïve Realists should reject this, but I’ll also highlight some suggestions as to how Naïve Realism might be developed in a non-diaphanous direction.

Stakeholder theory, as a method of management based on morals and behavior, must be grounded by a theory of ethics. However, traditional ethics of justice and rights cannot completely ground the theory. Following and expanding on the work of Wicks, Gilbert, and Freeman (1994), we believe that feminist ethics, invoking principles of caring, provides the missing element that allows moral theory to ground the stakeholder approach to management. Examples are given to support the suggested general principle for making business decisions (...) under feminist moral theory. (shrink)